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This paper will investigate the cultural aspects of the Europeanization process as applied in gender equality policies in Greece. Going beyond what it considers as simplifications and stereotypical views of the country's belonging to a "world of transposition neglect" due to administrative inefficiency, it will deal on the long history of "modernization discourse" in Greek politics, its ideological manifestations and social dynamics at different periods, as well as on its close, but ambiguous, even tense relationship with the idea of Europeanization. While compliance to EU obligations in gender policy often functions as a major legitimating factor for what is considered as gender equality measures, and while undeniably the EU makes a difference in national gender equality policies, especially in periods of government by the Right, different political groups make different strategic uses of the reference to the EU. Thus the Europeanization process can take various ideological flavors, touching at issues referring to identity(ies), which are by definition difficult especially in countries of the European periphery, while at the same time "Europeanization", which also depends on context, is in this case necessarily "Grecised". More importantly, one can often detect a latent framing referring simultaneously to the Europeanization process as a (positive) factor of modernization for Greece, and at the same time, Greece being viewed as the "fountainhead of Europe", as a superfluous route, full of procedural details that one has to go through the motions of, in order to have material gains.

I.

Historians of the Classical world have lately wondered (see for example G. Woolf, 1998) whether the notion of Romanization, very much in use in order to describe a long and slow process of cultural assimilation, in which the conquered gradually adopted Roman culture, was indeed a useful analytical concept. Or, on the contrary whether it relies upon arbitrary labels (who are the Romans?), forms a retrospective narrative and has an eschatological character. Other critics (R. Hingley 2000) underline the fact that Romanization represents a concept first used within a colonial framework, from which one expects researchers to have moved away from. Having in mind this history of the concept of Romanization, I cannot stop wondering if EU specialists using the term Europeanization, are aware of the analogy (and the irony). We could be repeating a very similar discussion and be implicated in a replica of the famous controversy concerning a process that happened hundreds of years ago, a discussion which today could be centered around the question *what is the European identity?* How can one (or a society) be Europeanized? Is Europe a given which is equated to the EU? Of course, Europeanization, viewed from the narrow vantage point of European *integration*, refers traditionally to the impact of the integration process on member state's political systems, and takes place through the effect of the transfer of competences to the EU level, as well as the adaptive response of the member state to EU inputs, and the convergence of policies. (Mény, Muller and Quermonne 1996; Closa 2001). In this sense Europeanization is a conventional notion, a term to help us identify a specific process that is much narrower and concrete than the term may permit one to think.

An important shift in Europeanization studies underlines the need to perceive the phenomenon less as a question of 'compliance' and more as a complex process which may even result in a bigger difference and not in convergence (Radaelli, 2004). This approach is much richer, especially for cases of the European periphery, which in reality as well as in theory occupy much less the EU literature. However up to now, Europeanization is always viewed from the vantage point of the EU, and as a concept in its analytical use is inherently meant to show (and measure) change towards a specific model. This does not mean that the compliance problematique is useless. On

the contrary, it can be useful, especially if we take into account what is stressed in the call for papers (Forest and Lombardo, 2009) “that compliance with the EU varies tremendously according to the issue at stake, so that a MS can be ‘compliant’ with EU law in violence issues (even if there are non binding instruments) due to strong feminist movement mobilisation, but then be incompliant in equal treatment at work (legislated through legally binding directives) due to factors such as the particular machinery in place, the colour of the party in government or the interaction between state and civil society actors. This means that, if we used the ‘worlds of compliance’ framework, one country would be part of one world in one issue but not in another. QUING findings are not the only ones challenging the ‘worlds of compliance’ framework, as Liebert (2003)’s analysis of gendering Europeanisation also shows that rigid country clusters do not make much sense for gender equality policies.” We could add also that in the case of Greece at least, the cost of measures applied, the magnitude of the necessary investment and the answer to the question ‘who is going to pay’, is a major criterium as to the degree of compliance: A few tv-spots against violence in the family that promote the implementation of measures to combat violence against women and cost a few thousand of euros, is preferred to taking (costly) measures in implementing structural reforms in order to combat the gender pay gap.

The above partial views of the matter are however not enough, in order to grasp the complex process of “Europeanization” in all its senses, especially in cases that do not form integral part of the paradigms in analysis. Thus, going beyond the compliance approach as well as beyond simplifications and stereotypical views of the country’s belonging to a “world of transposition neglect” due to administrative inefficiency - without however challenging the existence of structural inefficiencies that evidently play a practical role in the slow and hard implementation of reforms- we must refer to the long history of “modernization discourse” in Greek politics, its ideological manifestations and social dynamics at different periods, as well as on its close, but ambiguous, even tense relationship with the idea of Europeanization. This is the central issue when we want to study the Europeanization process in the case of

Greece¹. Thus Europeanization is viewed here also as perceived by the Greeks, and as a concept that adapts to the vantage point of its users, hence offering a richer conceptual variety to the notion. In a sense it is Europeanization Grecised in the particular case at hand, since **Europeanization is also perceived in its cultural aspects**. Evidently, as attested by the attempts to create binding constitutional-like treaties, the creation of a “European community of values and institutions”, is an important target for any union that wishes to go beyond a common market and a common economic community. The slow but steady forging of a common wish to unite and a common political culture incorporating common political perspectives and attitudes, are basic to such a process, while the European project, as attested by Europe’s constitutional momentum, must mobilize citizens in this direction, in order to be effective. The inexistence of a political culture of strong wish to unite, partly due to the type of relations that the citizens of EU countries have with Brussels (Ζερβάκη, 2007), is also a problem in the Europeanization process in its broader aspects, including political cultures.

In our QUING comparative report it was already noted that: “An initial question that arises concerning the frame comparison undertaken refers to *whether we are to expect important differences in the framing of gender equality policies between Greece and the EU*. The legitimacy of this question is linked to the fact that the importance of EU directives and recommendations in all campaigns, gender policies, legislation changes and equality measures in Greece, cannot be too strongly underlined. Is then one to expect that the wish to comply homogenises the framing? Obviously not. Because policy framing relates to deeper attitudes and conditionings that are the product of social history, class structure and gender regimes and thus characterize all aspects of a specific political culture. Policy framing goes beyond the wish to comply (or to not comply) to EU directives, since it expresses cultural realities deeply rooted.”

Furthermore, when we include **values and political cultures** as part of the process of Europeanization, we have to confront the question: what kind of (cultural) Europeanization? What is the content of this process? Which values prevail and must be shared? And, finally, which vision of Europe, is capable of uniting peoples and

¹ Which I suspect is not unique. It would be very interesting to see how other societies of the European periphery have elaborated the issue of modernization par rapport to that of Europeanization.

creating “a community of shared values and institutions?” Obviously, the EU of the 90’s -when 13 out of the then 15 EU member-states had social democratic governments- is not the same, with today’s EU countries in majority dominated by Right-wing governments (Spourdalakis, 2008). Are EU values those of the Right? As the traditional EU insistence on the market permits to think? And which Right? And is this an intrinsic characteristic of the EU political culture in the forging, if there is such a project?

When we confront the issue of Europeanization in terms of political culture, we must obviously deal also with the historical trends in the forging of the cultural aspects of politics in each member-state and try to pin-point perceptions, dominant attitudes and political behaviour linked to the history of each country that facilitate, more or less, or obstruct the forging of a common EU political culture. We can form the hypothesis that in some case the bigger national divergence on the level of political culture, the easier the process towards a unifying EU culture. Especially in cases where ethnic or religious cuts culturally separate citizens of the same state. In other cases however, when the national political culture is divided along different than the above lines, where it cuts horizontally a society along not very specific lines, and where there is a perpetual latent battle between world views that dramatically differ, while at different periods of time one dominates and the other is dominated (Διαμαντούρος, 2000), then the process of Europeanization, in every sense, becomes difficult, even tense, and may be accepted, even promoted, with very different views as to the outcome and objective. Such is the case of Greece, which is characterized by a profound cultural duality in which the modernization project is exclusively linked to one of the components, while the other, stands in a very ambiguous position between an arrogance, deriving from a glorification of an illustrious past which gave to Europe and the world democracy philosophy etc, whose continuity contemporary Greece is considered to be but is not acknowledged as much as it should, and a cultural ensemble in which an inferiority complex is evident, which is expressed by the feeling that “we are poor”, “every one is against us”, “we must take advantage of what we can because we do not deserve our fate”.² While after the end of the seven year

² For the culture duality of Greek society see Διαμαντούρος, 2000 and for the historical creation of Greek political culture see Diamandouros

dictatorship, in 1974, the “modernization subculture” is certainly the dominant one, the “underdog sub-culture” is still alive and very present in Greek politics and society, expressed across all party line and ideological stand points (Διαμαντούρος, 2000). Thus, Greek political culture is a major component in how the Europeanization process refers to Greece, as is the traditional character of the Greek gender regime system, as far as the specific process of Europeanization is linked to gender policy in this country.

In the above sense, and in order to refer to a framework that is mainstream in the bibliography following Jacquot and Woll’s analysis of Europeanisation (Jacquot and Woll 2003), we could say that Greece presents a special case of ‘legitimising usage’, a mix of strategic and cognitive usage in which actors refer to Europe in order to legitimise policymaking, a policymaking which in specific cases (ie a government by the Right in Greece) would not, but for the EU, be happening! Hence the reference to modernisation as means to make easier the acceptance of a measure, and which facilitates the equation modernisation=Europeanization, while Europeanization is viewed also from the vantage point of those that go through it. What I intend to argue here is that Europeanization -as a process and as a frame for gender policy in Greece- is shaped by the specific Greek case, due to the long history and central position of the modernization discourse in Greek politics and to the sometimes tense relations to Europe, to which there is a need to comply to, while sometimes (some) Greeks latently feel as Europeans par excellence. How can they then be Europeanized? And what happens to the modernization discourse, when Europeanization refers to a Europe whose values Greeks do not predominantly share at specific conjunctures?

II. The electoral campaign for the European Parliament, that ended up to the June 09 election, had in Greece a profoundly non EU character, centering on domestic policy and party antagonisms on internal issues. The Greek case is obviously not unique. It illustrates however perfectly the instrumental and non political way with which the Greek political system and voters deal with and perceive the EU. A non political perception reinforced by the fact that the two parties (ND and PASOK) that alternate in power in a strongly bi-partisan system, seem to converge on European issues.

Which does not mean that the two parties do not have important differences in their principles, in their social outlook and ideological references, differences that allow however for minor divergence in the “compliance” to EU directives. Especially as far as gender policy is concerned, i.e. an area, in which in general, there are no strong and overt resistances from influential interest groups. (Except for cases such as the acceptance of women that succeed in the entrance exams to the military academies/ which leaves out men!)

Thus, when in 2004 there was a change in government and the Right returned to power, it had neither the wish nor the strength to change existing gender policy which was predefined within Greece’s international obligations. So, we cannot speak of any major shift in gender policy, due to the political change from Centre-Left to Right, nor about eventual controversies that resulted in a different approach to issues of gender equality. What was noticed was more uneasiness/awkwardness at first, and a period of inertia, as well as a little less grasp of the matter and, certainly less conviction in what has to be done anyway. The main program for gender equality for the period 2004-2008, was according to the country’s 6th Report for the CEDAW, to develop “an integrated and cohesive strategic intervention, aiming to stress both the national importance and the supra-national dimension of gender equality issues.” These two parameters, it was said, render the promotion of such issues a national priority, they disengage gender equality issues from the category of marginal and special issues and stress their political, economic, social and developmental character, through their direct connection to prevailing national priorities (development, employment, social cohesion).” In other words, “gender policy for development” not for equality, justice, democracy etc. It is clearly the “modernisation argument”, resurfacing once more, in this case strongly supported by Europeanization undertones, that make it more concrete and even tangible.

It must also be reminded that as we found out in the frame comparison of gender policy between EU and Greece, the International obligations³, frame, while overtly prevalent in only one case, remains very important, since in almost all texts, especially in those coming from the government or main opposition party, as well as

³ GR/explreport3491.

from civil society, the international-obligation frame, linked to a modernisation vision is always apparent, even when not the dominant one. The modernisation vision is almost always latent in mainstream texts, and refers always to the EU influence and to compliance with it. However, as was noted in the comparison regarding the way EU influences the framing of gender issues in Greece, what was found was the importance on the matter of the competence of the EU on the respective issue. Whenever there is a policy proposal that follows EU directives or guidelines (in non-employment the Lisbon Employment Strategy, in sexual assault the transposition of EU directive etc) the discourse is influenced by and to an extent follows the EU framing, albeit in a more “superficial” way (that is, it usually lacks a combined approach that is evident of a more structural understating of the problem). On the contrary, on issues where the EU has no competence (the domestic violence sub-issue or the intimate citizenship issues) differences in the framing are more apparent. In Greece, besides the de-gendering of these issues there is an impressive emphasis on family as a unit and in children in particular. Apparently, the well-being of children (either the unborn children in cases of conception through artificial insemination or those that are victims of domestic violence or trafficking) justifies more easily the application of such legislative measures.

The modernisation argument has a very long history in Greek political culture, and is a dominant participant in political discourse after the end of the dictatorship (1974), be it under the sign of democratisation initially, then of “allaghi” (change), of modernisation per se during the Simitis PASOK period and lately under the sign of reforms. Indeed, Greek political culture, as was mentioned above, is a very complex, and in some ways strongly contradictory, entity which combines traditional elements with aspects of a modern culture in a particular way.⁴ The particularity consists in the fact that aspects of a modernised and a more traditional culture co-exist, cutting horizontally the totality of Greek society, surfacing and gaining momentum at different historical moments, without us (researchers) being able to correspond once and for all specific social and political forces to specific cultural groups. However, as after 1974, the “modernisation” cultural subgroup seems to have the upper hand and

⁴ On the historical origins and current trends of the Greek political culture, see, N. Diamandouros, 1983 and 1993.

to promote a respective discourse that gives meaning and substance to almost all political discourse, the reference to the acceptance of the Europeanization project is usually smooth and non challenged.

It is noteworthy that the important changes in the legal status of women in Greece that took place during the 80s, as a result of feminist demands and of the policies of the party in power, were implemented explicitly in view of the “modernisation of Greek society”. Modernisation has always been the main and most successful legitimating discourse. While most of the equality demands of the women’s movement of the 70s and early 80s have more or less been satisfied, in order to modernise Greece, new member of the EC, it became obvious that the diminution of legal inequality is not sufficient in order to abolish gender discrimination, exploitation and inequality. Hence the need of many measures that are being taken in favour of women and against gender inequality in accordance with European decisions and prevalent relative trends. Indeed, if women's social inferiority is always apparent in Greek society, it functions today in a new climate of gender awareness and legitimisation of gender equality, created in previous decades by feminist political activity, but gaining mainstream weight through a modernisation discourse. While the importance of EU directives can not be too strongly underlined in all campaigns and gender equality measures, it must be noted that their being accepted as modernising measures facilitates their acceptance in a profoundly patriarch society, which at the same time sometimes shows arrogant and under-dog features in its dealings with the EU.

Modernisation equals Europeanization in today’s Greek political perception. Not only there is no other view on how to overcome traditional problems in the Greek polity, than to comply to EU directives and, more importantly, to depend on EU funding, but there is minimal discussion on “which” Europe would be better for Greece and Europe itself. While Europeanization is perceived as an inevitable phenomenon, almost natural, whose pace we can accelerate by pressures for more funds and more accommodating measures for rural products, or for Greek “particularities” i.e. the educational system, no political or social force, except the Communist Party, expresses any fundamental critics on the EU itself. Whatever critique there is, it is mainly addressed at Greek inability to attract more funds, to accommodate the Greek

rural economy etc. It is thus addressed to Greek officials and political parties that have to deal with the EU reality, as if the latter is given once for all, independent of Europeans and of political matters that govern internal politics.

Given this widespread initial unconditional acceptance of the EU as well as the prevalence of the modernisation/Europeanization discourse it is interesting to note the conclusions of the study by Feathersone and Papadimitriou (2008), referring to the fact that among 30 OCDE countries, Greece shows a major need for reforms (only Mexico and Turkey show a bigger need), while exhibiting the worst reforming capacity. The combination of constant reference and wide political and social acceptance of modernisation, perceived as Europeanization, combined with an inability to perform reforms, which is concretised in social policy, employment, sustainability, education and research, among others, seems characteristic of the Greek political system and of Greek political culture. The fact that the primary structure in need of important reform is the public administration itself, does not facilitate things, as neither does the low level of elaboration and thinking of all aspects of the application processes of the reforms, that characterises the today existing attempts.

III

In order to empirically research the hypothesis, according to which Europeanization and modernization are equated today in Greek political culture, we may initially start by a reference to the MAGEEQ findings concerning Greece, where it was noted that Greece was one of the three countries where the European and international pressure to increase women's share in elected bodies was present. The main idea was that the failure to include positive measures for increasing the share of women in elected bodies is a problem due to the pressure to conform with the EU policy prescriptions and other Member states' regulations. Both the EU and other European countries have a legitimating role for pro-quotas discourses. Indeed, in Greece, pro-quotas discourse sought legitimacy in EU countries regulations and especially wanted to distance Greece from third-world countries, where women's percentages were very low. Almost all speakers on quotas in the Greek Parliament felt the need to legitimise their pro-quota attitude

with reference to other, mainly EU countries, while the small number of women in political decision making in Greece was explicitly compared to third world countries. Insecure attitudes of the speakers who wanted to stress the need to prove that Greece, is a western country, belongs to Europe and thus must, at all costs not be behind third world countries in this issue. Comparisons of women's percentages with other countries was thus framed in terms of the ever present and always successful modernisation argument, i.e. alignment with more developed countries and distance from less developed ones as a sign of modernisation, while at the same time the implementation of quotas presented as according the spirit of EU policy, gained one extra point. But essentially Europeanization and modernisation appeared explicitly as one and the same.

We must add to the above, that the MAGEEQ country study for Greece also showed that while gender equality is not perceived as an issue in which power relations are at stake, nor as a controversial project and as a target to struggle for. It is mainly perceived in a positive sense, as something that we all agree upon, because common sense tells as to, while gender equality appears also as something ill-defined, whose "fuzziness" is precisely the reason why all can agree. The under-conceptualised character of gender equality in Greek political culture seems also to be the reason for the facility with which contradictory views are expressed. Pro-gender equality discourses easily combine views that belong to profoundly traditional narratives, something that is indicative of a dominant (restrictive) equation, in Greek political culture, of gender equality policy to pro-women measures. The whole issue is however always conceptualised as part of a modernisation discourse, "European Greece" wishing to appear more European, a process that seems often inevitable, (if we want to be of sound mind and see what we have to gain) as if "progress" is a matter of course, which we must not obstruct, while the framing is strongly context related.

Furthermore, we have seen in the analysis that the reference to the EU is an important point for the legitimation of any policy proposal in the Greek Parliament, for all supporters of a specific gender measure, regardless of whether the measure is in fact presented as of EU inspiration. This applies to the whole of the Left-Right axis, with the obvious exception of the anti-EU communists. Also, the existence of an emphasis

on the need to conform to European and international law and rules, rather than to the need to change actual social structures and gender perceptions in Greek society, which is especially evident in sexuality issues, is a sign of proof concerning the strength and the importance of the modernization/ Europeanization legitimating argument. Also, the many contradictions and inconsistencies that are very often noted in discourses referring to women and to gender equality which are largely due to the prevailing of gender stereotypes that emerge almost automatically, even in the most progressive(?) discourses, as well as the common reference to traditional values presented in a conservative manner (i.e. the importance of family etc.) being paired with progressive attitudes showing an acceptance of gender equality, forms an important testimony as to the duality of the Greek political culture. Within it, the modernization discourse has always had a special position, occupied today by the slightly different Europeanization one.

It was also mentioned above that since the return of the Right to power in 2004, it is more evident in Greek mainstream gender equality discourse that what it refers to, is “gender policy for development” not for equality, justice, democracy etc. It is clearly the “modernisation argument”, resurfacing once more, in this case strongly supported by Europeanization under-tones. The fact that gender policy is perceived as an EU obligation, which is nevertheless positive because it is modernising, is probably the reason why, as we noticed in the *LARG Country Study for Greece* the analysed texts lack a developed diagnosis, remaining as a rule on a shallow under-problematized level. In general, prognosis is more developed, either in length, depth or in concreteness, showing un-balanced texts leaning more towards ‘what is to be done’ EU inspired of course, and less towards “what is the problem”. Often speakers seem just to repeat the EU jargon and to arrive at the simplistic prognosis “we must comply with EU law and directives” Also, in 2004 for the first time, and ever since from the government’s mouth, gender policy is presented as a way to economic development, so is even more “Europeanized”.

In the case of the mainstream discourse on sexual violence the Europeanization approach has a specific weight, since the EU appears even as a normative group as are the international community or “modern countries” in general. The problems of sexual violence are mostly viewed in Greek political culture as human rights issues,

and are perceived as related to the harmonization and thus modernization of the Greek legal system and/or Greek social norms and values. Hence, the obvious link of modernisation as a positive process and Europeanization, as an inevitable way in the present situation. It is interesting to note that when dealing with trafficking, the Greek political culture, as attested by the analysis in QUING, seems to see active actors as almost exclusively institutional actors, state actors to be precise. Therefore, the problem of trafficking is seen as generating from the inefficiency of the Greek State or the Greek government to apply laws, or harmonize its legislation to that of the EU, or of the international community or the EU itself, which has an ineffective policy regarding criminal activities. The need for the harmonization of Greek law with European and international directives is indeed very commonly stressed and is most evident in texts on trafficking.

In general, compliance as a *mot d'ordre* is highly legitimised while in the diagnosis of problems related to gender inequality, a variety of norms are referred to such as “equal treatment”, “equal opportunities”, “economic development”, “efficiency”, “cooperation”, “anti-discrimination”, but also, “equality” society with “no exploitation”, “respect of civil rights”. In the problem solution in addition to the above norms, the “Europeanization” of the country appears a value per se. Depending on the provenance of the text we obviously note a different main normative message, but when the minister of the Interior (who supervises gender equality) speaks, we have the impression that the main underlying norm, apart from the expected new reference to economic development is that “Lisbon says so”, but also, “this is good”. In accordance to many official Greek texts, EU directives seem to be perceived as unavoidable natural phenomena, while at the same time it appears that change in attitudes is by definition good, while social problems such as discrimination derive from out-dated social prejudice which is socially detrimental, and which can be overcome by... Europeanization.

If the above cultural aspect of politics, in which the total acceptance of the EU in accordance with the modernisation discourse, is today undeniably dominant, it co-exists with, is influenced by and is even politically threatened by the main rival cultural entity, that of the underdog culture, which is introverted, conservative, traditional and xenophobic. (Διαμαντούρος 2003). In terms of identity formation,

while the modernization culture turns to Europe, choosing the latter between the eternal fight between West and East, which has always been a Greek cultural split, and proclaims its wish to be European, thus embracing Europeanization, in spite of its condescending undertones, the underdog culture continuous to view Europe as a threat to Greek values and social norms, to Greek sovereignty and to simultaneously promote an identity of by definition European because Greek.

As for gender policy, in spite of the small importance accorded to gender issues in Greek politics and society, its importance is major as a means of modernization under the label of Europeanisation. But is the specific gender policy important as a means of structurally intervening and changing the gender regime in Greece? Probably not, especially since it is framed as if it is economic development which renders gender equality necessary as a means to an end, promoting it as nothing more than a few measures in favour of specific women, but not really intended to create change in the gender relations system. Thus, the basic framing of gender equality policies in Greece does not appear as really transformative, but rather as a way to promote efficiency and development in a modernising way and also to accommodate EU obligations. Human rights, equal opportunities etc are not absent as more or less latent conceptualisations in gender equality discourse, as is a specific vision of structural framing, but these are not the main point in dominant (numerically and from the point of view of power relations) frames.

Comparing Greek and EU discourses in QUING, we noticed that official Greek voices show big similarities with mainstream EU discourse, presenting framings related to *efficiency-governance* and even *discrimination*, with references to women's employment, while being less developed and more shallow: Overlooking the *structural aspects of gender inequality* which are present in EU frames and totally absent in the Greek case (apart from certain references to capitalism as structure), Greek frames present a narrow vision of gender equality as target, which does not permit great expectations for change. Is this surprising? No. The Greek Right, in government, combining neo-liberal EU oriented elements with traditional ones of a century old Greek populist Right, could not possibly present a different image. As for civil society and its spoke-persons, even the more 'progressive' ones, they are still part of a rather traditional society in which gender and gender roles are at

best viewed in a human rights perspective. No major changes in the existing gender regime are, nor can they be anticipated. Just interventions to make it less overtly unjust and less obstructing economic “progress”. So what about Europeanization? If gender policy is very important in the Greek political culture for the Europeanization of polity, as I tried to argue above, will Europeanization be very important for the eventual changes in the reality of gender in Greek society? The answer obviously refers to what was mentioned before: Which Europe are we talking about? If it is today’s EU, with the specific prevalent values and instrumental perception of human life, then the answer has to be negative.

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